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The continued exclusion of
the Southern Transitional
Council from peace talks
may cause future conflicts
in Yemen, but the inclusion
of STC presents multiple
dilemmas for the Yemeni
government.
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reliance placed on them.
Excluded from the Geneva
III peace process talks in
September 2018 geared
towards ending the
country’s three-year conflict,
Yemen’s Southern
Transitional Council (STC)
faces a dilemma. At odds
with the Yemeni
government, the STC was
founded in May 2017 by
Aden’s former-governor
Aydrus al-Zubaydi, after he
was fired by President Abd
Rabbu Mansour Hadi two
weeks earlier. In terms of
representing Southern
interests, the Council has
since emerged as South
Yemen’s most prominent
and well organised political
actor. Its barring from talks
at the hand of the President
Hadi is likely to continue
due to the dilemma the
Council poses to the central
government as well as the
limited mandate of the UN
Special Envoy’s Office to
Yemen.
The continued exclusion of
the Southern Council may
become the catalyst for
future conflicts in Yemen
putting pressure on an
Oxford Research Group | Blog | Yemen’s Peace Process: Dil... https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/blog/yemens-peace-...
2 of 11 27/11/2018, 14:38
already vulnerable and war-
torn population. But for the
Yemeni government, the
STC exacerbates multiple
dilemmas common to
centre-periphery conflicts.
Dilemmas of Inclusion
Should Hadi grant Zubaydi
access to peace
negotiations, he will confer
legitimacy onto an
organisation whose aims
are contrary to the
government’s. Indeed,
although STC officials have
issued multiple conflicting
statements on its aims in
the year after its
inauguration, the primary
stated aim is creating an
independent state in South
Yemen free from “the
occupation of Sanaa and its
tyrannical regime.”
However, key to its aims is
also maintaining good
relations with the Arab
Coalition, of which the
United Arab Emirates (UAE)
is a key political and
financial backer of the
Council, as well as
combating terrorism. STC
rhetoric has regularly
framed the continued
Oxford Research Group | Blog | Yemen’s Peace Process: Dil... https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/blog/yemens-peace-...
3 of 11 27/11/2018, 14:38
presence of Hadi’s
government in Aden and
pro-Hadi forces found in
seven districts in al-Dhalea
governorate as part of the
‘Northern occupation’ and
demanded their departure.
This is stretched further by
occasional claims made by
Southern activists that the
Hadi government is
‘infiltrated by Islah’ and that
the Islah political party –
which has a wing affiliated
with the Muslim
Brotherhood – is “born of
terrorism and extremism”
and a reason for insecurity
in Aden.
The ‘reward’ of recognition
by Hadi by providing access
to peace negotiations may
also further encourage other
groups to take up arms
against the Yemeni
government to secure a
form of political autonomy.
Indeed, the STC has been
criticised by members of the
central government for
adopting ‘coup’ tactics
similar to the Houthis in the
North, who took control with
the capture of Sanaa in
September 2014.
Consolidating their position,
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the Houthis forced the Hadi
government to re-locate to
the southern port city of
Aden in February 2015
sparking the armed
intervention by the Saudi-led
Arab Coalition on March 23,
2015.
Members of the Hadi
government argue that the
events of January 2018 had
similar motivations. On
January 21, 2018, Zubaydi
announced his ultimatum,
namely to shuffle the
cabinet of the Yemeni
government and sack Prime
Minister Ahmed bin Daghr.
When the deadline passed,
armed clashes broke out
across the Adeni
neighbourhoods of Khur
Maksar, Mansoura, and Dar
Saad, killing around 30 and
eventually forcing an
intervention by the Arab
Coalition as STC-aligned
militias captured military
camps belonging to the
Presidential Protection
Forces and almost captured
the Presidential Palace in al-
Maashiq, Aden.
Bolstered by their military
victory against pro-Hadi
forces, the STC initially
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appeared to have taken
control of Aden. However, by
April 12, Prime Minister bin
Daghr returned with a small
entourage of ministers and
by April 22, Hadi re-
confirmed his refusal to re-
shuffle the government.
Meanwhile, the STC faced
increased pressure due to
its support for Tariq Saleh,
the nephew of the late
former-President Ali
Abdullah Saleh, who
became aligned with the
STC through their Emirati
benefactors, which allowed
Tariq to re-arm and re-group
after their exodus from
northern Yemen. In Spring
2018, as its one-year
anniversary approached, the
STC also faced political
pressure from other
southern actors in al-Mahra
and Hadramawt and from
organisations such as the
Supreme Council of the
Revolutionary Forces of the
South.
Another factor that remains
unclear for the consolidation
of the STC is the degree of
command it holds over
various military units in the
South. Although these units
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appear to align their
interests with the STC, there
are conflicting reports as to
their command structure.
The Security Belt of Aden
and Lahj, as well as the
Shabwani and Hadrami Elite
forces, according to Adnan
al-Kaf – head of the STC’s
Economic and Finance
department – are not linked
to the STC. Similarly,
Commander ‘Abu Zahra’ al-
Mahrami of the ‘Brigade of
Giants’ issued a statement
in June 2018 refuting
allegations of links between
the ‘Giants’ and the STC.
These reports appear to
confirm Hani bin Brayk’s
statement that, “the
[Council] does not have any
armed forces affiliated with
it” although he also added
that Zubaydi is a
commander of the Southern
Resistance.
Looking forward
Regarding the Yemeni
government, it is difficult to
see the STC reconcile with
them in the short term due
to opposing aims. According
to unconfirmed reports, the
STC’s official spokesman,
Saleh bin Farid al-Awlaqi,
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made an attempt to
reconcile with the Yemeni
government in mid-March
2018, allegedly meeting
with Yemeni government
officials in Riyadh. This
report was denied. However,
after the return of bin Daghr
to Aden in April, STC rhetoric
incorporated various
caveats, including that they
were not “against the
legitimacy of President
Hadi” or actually attempting
to oust bin Daghr, but rather
targeting the interior
minister, Ahmed al-Maysari.
In late-June 2018 another
unconfirmed report noted
that the STC’s Deputy
Speaker of the National
Assembly, Muhammad Ali
al-Shadadi, was leading a
mediation effort for the
Council to meet with Hadi. A
few days later on June 28,
Ahmed bin Brayk was
quoted by Sputnik saying,
“The President is also called
upon to extend his hand to
his brothers in the
Transitional Council, and
this is not wrong” – but he
also noted that this was not
an attempt to get in good
standing with the Yemeni
government. The
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government’s opinion on the
matter, however, was
expressed by bin Daghr in
an interview with the
Egyptian daily, Youm Sebaa,
namely that the government
aimed to delay dealing with
the STC, until after the post-
conflict period, where
elections would provide the
outlet for conflict resolution.
It is possible that if the
Transitional Council’s
members manage to further
consolidate their position
and bolster their regional
political backing, they may
gain access to peace
negotiations through
peaceful means. In May
2018, Zubaydi called for a
‘South-South’ dialogue to
take place in Cairo and Abu
Dhabi between various
historical figures including
Presidents Ali Salim al-Beidh
(an STC supporter) and Ali
Muhammad Nasser (an STC
sceptic), as well as Khalid
Bahah (Hadi’s former Prime
Minister). In addition, few
months after his
resignation, Aden’s former
governor, Abd al-Aziz al-
Miflahi, reportedly stated
that the “[Council] is a real
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partner and should not be
underestimated.”
Indeed, the STC should not
be underestimated. Despite
accusations of alleged
corruption and human rights
violations – including extra
judicial killings and illegal
detention, as well as their
inability to provide services
such as electricity and
running water – attempts at
shedding doubt on the
cohesion of Council appears
to be mostly hyperbolic.
Indeed, over the last year,
the STC consolidated much
of its institutional structure
across the South down to
the directorate level (a work
in progress), while fending
off various political
challenges. Despite the
Council’s potential to
continue conflict on the
regional level, this has yet to
translate to national level
influence. However, the
degree of national-level
influence is liable to change
in a rapidly changing
security environment.
Domestically, the STC’s
close relationship with the
UAE remains one of their
opponent’s main critiques
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against them and their
relationship shed
uncertainty on how the
Council may navigate any
potential shifts in Emirati
regional policy.
Image credit: Wikimedia
Commons. 
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